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The Misunderstood Role of Reliance in
American Pipe Tolling
Jeremy L. Brown†
The commencement of a class action tolls statutes of limitations for all members of the putative class. This rule, so simply stated by the Supreme Court in
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, has proved complicated in practice.
Since American Pipe, lower courts have disagreed about the circumstances under
which the tolling rule applies. Though the Court has resolved many of these disagreements, some uncertainties remain. This Comment takes up two of those questions. First, does tolling benefit plaintiffs who sue while class certification is pending? Second, does tolling benefit plaintiffs who opt out of a certified class? My
analysis takes advantage of two recent Supreme Court decisions that clarify the
legal basis of a doctrine left untouched for over three decades. These decisions
make clear that American Pipe is a creature of courts’ equitable powers. This fact
limits when tolling can apply. Most importantly, the judicially crafted tolling rule
must respect the statutory intent of the time bar to be tolled. I argue that class action tolling respects the statutory intent of time bars only when plaintiffs claiming
tolling have plausibly relied on the class action proceedings. This general rule, applied to the questions considered in this Comment, yields different answers depending on the exact time bars faced by plaintiffs. In general, plaintiffs facing a
statute of limitations should benefit from tolling only if they sue after the class is
denied certification or otherwise terminates. But plaintiffs facing two time bars—a
statute of limitations and a statute of repose—should, in some cases, benefit from
tolling even when they file before the certification ruling.
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INTRODUCTION
Both class actions and statutory time bars increase efficiency in litigation. Class actions do so by allowing the claims of
many plaintiffs to be brought and adjudicated together. Plaintiffs benefit from the work of class representatives. Statutory
time bars, such as statutes of limitations, enhance litigative efficiency by ensuring that claims are brought promptly. They also
protect defendants by barring claims brought after undue delay.
In practice, class actions and time bars can clash. A member
of a putative class might hold off suing individually because she
anticipates benefiting from a class action. If the class action falls
apart—say because class certification is denied or the class representative settles individually—then members of the defunct
putative class might then sue separately. By this point, however, plaintiffs’ claims may be untimely because the statute of limitations expired while they relied on the class to press their
claims. Absent a special exception for such plaintiffs, they are
induced to file their own suits before the statute of limitations
expires to preserve the ability to litigate their claims if the class
action falls apart. These potentially superfluous lawsuits are often called “protective filings.”
Fortunately for plaintiffs, the Supreme Court recognized
class action tolling in American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
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Utah.1 That case and its progeny set out a rule that tolls putative class members’ statutes of limitations during the pendency
of class certification, allowing putative class members to sue individually if they cannot proceed with the class. This tolling
rule—often called “American Pipe tolling” or “class action tolling”—has been the subject of numerous disagreements among
the lower courts.
This Comment considers two of the American Pipe doctrine’s
unresolved questions. The first question is whether plaintiffs
can claim class action tolling if they file separate, individual
suits while class certification is pending. The issue, in other
words, is whether plaintiffs must wait for a class certification
ruling to take advantage of tolling. Most courts apply tolling irrespective of whether individual plaintiffs sue before or after the
certification ruling, but some withhold tolling until after the certification process. The second question is whether tolling extends to plaintiffs who opt out of a certified class. Most courts,
relying on Supreme Court dicta, apply tolling to such plaintiffs.
But some courts have suggested that American Pipe tolling applies only to class members who are deprived of a spot in a
class—either because certification is denied or because the class
action terminates for another reason.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the American Pipe
doctrine after leaving it untouched for over three decades. In
2017, the Court held in California Public Employees’ Retirement
System v. ANZ Securities, Inc.2 (CalPERS) that American Pipe
does not toll statutes of repose—time bars similar to but distinct
from statutes of limitations. One year later, in China Agritech,
Inc. v. Resh,3 the Court held that the doctrine does not toll the
limitations period for successively filed class (as opposed to individual) actions. These decisions provide valuable insight into the
doctrine’s legal basis and clarify when it is appropriate to apply
class action tolling.
In this Comment, I derive guiding principles from CalPERS
and China Agritech to determine the circumstances in which
class action tolling applies. The first principle is that American
Pipe is an equitable tolling doctrine. Equitable tolling rules
must yield to legislative commands; accordingly, tolling must
comport with the statutory intent of time bars. The second prin1
2
3

414 U.S. 538 (1974).
137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).
138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018).
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ciple is that American Pipe serves efficiency and judicial economy by guaranteeing putative class members an opportunity to
vindicate their rights without requiring potentially superfluous
protective filings within their own limitations periods. Importantly, the doctrine’s equitable nature means that it cannot
flout statutory commands to promote this efficiency goal.
Using these principles, I argue that plaintiffs should benefit
from class action tolling only when the timing of their individual
suits suggests that they might have relied on the class proceedings before becoming unable to do so. For ease of exposition, I
call this “plausible reliance.” Whether courts should find the
requisite plausible reliance depends on the precise time bars
plaintiffs face. Plaintiffs facing only a statute of limitations
should be found to have relied—and thus receive tolling—only if
they sue after class certification is denied or the class otherwise
falls apart. In contrast, plaintiffs facing a statute of limitations
and an additional time bar called a statute of repose should, in
some cases, benefit from tolling even if they sue while class certification is pending.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I review
the origins of American Pipe tolling as well as the doctrine’s
more recent developments. As I explain, these pronouncements
clarify important aspects of the doctrine that were left ambiguous in earlier cases. In Part II, I review the various approaches
courts have taken on the question whether tolling applies to
suits filed before the certification decision and the question
whether tolling applies to opt-out plaintiffs. I also clarify the positions of some courts that are sometimes, I believe, mistakenly
said to have taken sides on the first of these issues. Finally, in
Part III, I use what we have learned from the Court’s recent
pronouncements to derive key principles about the doctrine’s
application. Applying these principles reveals a generally applicable rule: only plaintiffs who have plausibly relied on the class
to press their claims should receive tolling. Plausibly relying
plaintiffs are those who appear to have delegated their claims to
the class proceedings and now sue individually only because
they can no longer rely on the putative class. Whether plausible
reliance exists—and hence whether tolling should apply—
depends on the exact time bars faced by plaintiffs.
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I. THE AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING DOCTRINE
Time bars preclude actions that fail to satisfy specific timing
requirements.4 Statutory time bars, such as statutes of limitations and statutes of repose,5 require that claims be brought
within a defined period of time that begins running at a specified trigger.6
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 19337 provides examples
of both a statute of limitation and a statute of repose. It begins
by providing that “[n]o action shall be maintained . . . unless
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”8 This time bar is a
statute of limitations; it explains that the limitations period endures for one year and accrues (begins running) when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the claim.9 The statute
then sets out a second time bar, providing that “[i]n no event
shall any such action be brought . . . more than three years after
the security was bona fide offered to the public.”10 This time bar,
the statute of repose, sets an outside boundary for bringing
claims.11 Under this dual time-bar scheme, the statute of limitations requires a plaintiff to bring her claim within one year of
when she discovers or should have discovered her claim. Critically, the statute of repose categorically prohibits claims brought
more than three years after the security offering. This means a
claim could be lost to the repose bar before the plaintiff even discovers its existence.12

4
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Leave Time for Trouble: The Limitations Periods Under the Securities Laws, 40 J. CORP. L. 143, 155 (2014).
5
Other time bars include jurisdictional time limits and the judge-made doctrine of
laches. Id. at 156 & n.65.
6
See id. at 155–56.
7
Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa).
8
15 U.S.C. § 77m; see CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2047.
9
See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049.
10 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
11 See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8 (2014) (“A statute of repose . . . puts
an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action. That limit is measured not from the
date on which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last culpable act or
omission of the defendant.”).
12 See Catalina Ford, Note, For Whom the Statute Tolls: American Pipe Tolling and
Statutes of Repose in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 599,
607–08 (2014).
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Importantly, there are excuses plaintiffs can invoke when
their filings would otherwise be untimely.13 One such excuse is
tolling of the statutory period.14 Tolling stops the clock on a time
bar, giving a plaintiff more time to file a claim.15 It may be permitted under circumstances described by statute or by principles
of equity applied by courts.16 As we will see, the source of a tolling rule—equitable and judicially crafted versus legal and based
in statute—can be critical in determining whether tolling applies under particular circumstances.
These are the basic mechanics of time bars and tolling. In
the next Section, I explicate the American Pipe doctrine’s origins
and early development. Then, in Part I.B, I review the Court’s
more recent pronouncements on the doctrine. Part I.C distills
key insights from these recent cases that will be important in
determining when class action tolling applies.
A.

The Origins of Class Action Tolling

In American Pipe, the Supreme Court was asked to recognize a new type of tolling. The state of Utah had filed a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) on behalf of itself and purported class members eleven days before
the relevant statute of limitations expired.17 Several months later, the district court denied class certification.18 Eight days after
this ruling, members of the class Utah had putatively represented moved to intervene as individual plaintiffs.19 The parties disagreed whether the intervenors’ motion was timely. If the limitations period had continued to run during the pendency of class

13

See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 4, at 156.
See Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive
Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 813–19 (2006). Other legal excuses for untimeliness
include estoppel, forfeiture, and waiver. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 4, at
156.
15 See Damon W. Taaffe, Comment, Tolling the Deadline for Appealing in Absentia
Deportation Orders Due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1065,
1068 & n.23 (2001).
16 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 813–19; see also CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2050;
Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (“It is hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling, unless tolling would be inconsistent with
the text of the relevant statute.” (quotation marks and citation omitted) (first quoting
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990); and then quoting United States
v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998))).
17 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 541–42.
18 Id. at 542–43.
19 Id. at 543–44; see China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1804.
14
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certification, then the intervenors’ claims were months late. But
if the limitations period was suspended from the class filing until the class certification ruling, the intervenors’ motion was
timely with three days to spare.
The Court found the intervenors’ claims timely, holding
that the class filing tolled the statute of limitations for putative
class members seeking to intervene after the denial of class certification.20 Notably, tolling was extended to all putative
class members, including those that did not rely on or were
unaware of the now-defunct class suit.21
The Court noted two primary concerns in devising the tolling rule: litigative efficiency and respecting the purposes of
statutes of limitations.22 As to efficiency, the Court sought to
prevent needless motions by putative class members. Without
tolling, they might file intervening motions within their own
limitations period because of the risk that the class will be denied certification after that period’s expiration. Such motions
“would deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure.”23
The Court sought to solve this problem by tolling the claims of
putative class members suing after the denial of class certification.
The scope of the Court’s efficiency justification is unclear.
The tolling rule might be justified simply because it relieves individual class members of potentially superfluous protective filings. That is, the Court might have been worried only about the
burden on individual litigants. But American Pipe can reasona20 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 552–53. More precisely, the Court held that tolling applies
when a class is denied certification for failure to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s numerosity requirement. Id. The Court’s subsequent decision in Crown, Cork
& Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), implicitly extended American Pipe to situations in which class certification is denied for other reasons. Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Class Actions, Statutes of Limitations and Repose, and Federal
Common Law, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19 (2018). Note also that states remain free to
craft—or not craft—their own class action tolling rules. David Bober, Comment, CrossJurisdictional Tolling: When and Whether a State Court Should Toll Its Statute of Limitations Based on the Filing of a Class Action in Another Jurisdiction, 32 SETON HALL L.
REV. 617, 625 (2002). In practice, however, states look to federal case law, and especially
the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, when creating their own class action tolling rules.
See id.; Tanya Pierce, Improving Predictability and Consistency in Class Action Tolling, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 339, 370 (2016).
21 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551.
22 See Charles F. Sawyer, Comment, Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 106, 108–09 (1981).
23 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553.
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bly be read more expansively: grounded in Rule 23 and intended
to further its policies.24 This ambiguity presages later disagreements among lower courts as to whether the American Pipe doctrine is one of equitable tolling or statutorily based legal tolling.25
Turning to the Court’s second concern, statutes of limitations, the Court explained that tolling was consistent with the
policies underlying these time bars.26 This was chiefly because
the class filing put defendants on notice of the claims and generic identities of potential plaintiffs.27 The Court also stated,
though without explanation, that tolling was consistent with the
policy of preventing plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights.28 For
these reasons, the Court determined it appropriate to toll the intervenors’ limitations periods. As noted above, the Court extended tolling to all putative class members, including those
who did not rely on the now-defunct class suit.29 This is interesting given that some of the American Pipe plaintiffs had submitted affidavits to the district court attesting to their reliance on
the class action.30
Following American Pipe, a circuit split soon developed on
the question whether the tolling doctrine applies only to those
intervening in the existing action, or, additionally, to separate
actions for the same claims.31 The Court resolved this split in
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,32 where it extended class ac24 Compare id. (“A contrary rule allowing participation only by those potential
members of the class who had earlier filed motions to intervene in the suit would deprive
Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure.”), with Crown, 462 U.S. at 350 (“The American Pipe Court recognized that unless the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the class action,
class members would not be able to rely on the existence of the suit to protect their
rights.”).
25 See Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 535 (9th Cir. 2011) (exploring this disagreement).
26 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554–55.
27 Id.
28 See id. The purposes of statutes of limitations are discussed further in greater
detail in Part III.A.
29 Id. at 551.
30 See Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 101–02 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 473 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973), aff’d, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
31 For one commentator’s contemporary account of the circuit split, see Sawyer,
Comment, supra note 22, at 120–22. Intervening in the existing action or filing a separate action both allow plaintiffs to proceed individually. The primary difference is that
separate actions can be brought in different courts than that of the first action. See id. at
122–23.
32 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
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tion tolling to separate actions brought after the denial of class
certification.33
As in American Pipe, the Court’s analysis centered on litigative efficiency and the purposes of statutes of limitations. The
Court explained that putative class members who “fear[ ] that
class certification may be denied” would file separate actions
prior to the expiration of their own limitations periods.34 “The
result would be a needless multiplicity of actions—precisely the
situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the tolling
rule of American Pipe were designed to avoid.”35 Turning to the
purposes of statutes of limitations, the Court again focused on
notice to defendants and whether plaintiffs had slept on their
rights. Notice to defendants was satisfied because the class filing puts defendants on notice of the potential claims against
them.36 And plaintiffs who bring individual suits after class certification is denied, the Court explained, “cannot be accused of
sleeping on their rights” because “Rule 23 both permits and encourages class members to rely on the named plaintiffs to press
their claims.”37
This discussion shows that the Crown Court considered tolling justified, at least in part, by putative class members’ reliance on the class proceedings. Yet, as in American Pipe, it did
not require plaintiffs to prove that they actually relied on the
class proceedings. It is not clear why American Pipe and Crown
forewent this requirement.38 One possibility is that the burden of
proving reliance might unfairly induce preemptive protective filings by those who fear that the class proceedings will fall
apart.39 Another theory is that American Pipe is intended to affirmatively protect those putative class members who are una-

33

Id. at 350.
Id. at 350–51.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 352–53 (explaining that class action defendants “will be aware of the
need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the
class”).
37 Crown, 462 U.S. at 352–53.
38 See Kenneth S. Prince, Case Note, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1010, 1028
(1974) (arguing that plaintiffs should have to prove past awareness of class proceedings
in order to benefit from class action tolling).
39 Cf. Rahr v. Grant Thornton LLP, 142 F. Supp. 2d 793, 800 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(“[T]he class action tolling doctrine is intended to avoid the injustice and judicial inefficiency of requiring putative class members to file individual suits or to lose their
claims.”).
34

694

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:685

ware of a class action.40 These competing perspectives may be at
the root of the unresolved issues considered in this Comment.
The Court has never decided whether class action tolling
applies to those who opt out of a certified class.41 Importantly,
both American Pipe and Crown concerned suits brought after
the denial of class certification.42 But some courts have read Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,43 a Supreme Court case about
Rule 23’s notice requirement, to extend tolling to plaintiffs who
opt out of certified classes.44
Understanding the notice issue in Eisen is necessary to understand how courts have read it to extend tolling to opt-out
plaintiffs. There, names and addresses were readily available for
many of the class’s individual members.45 But the district court,
wary of substantial notice costs, did not require individual notice to these class members.46 The Supreme Court determined
that this ruling contravened Rule 23’s clear requirement of “individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.”47
Tolling came up only indirectly. The Eisen class representative argued that individual notice was not worthwhile because
class members could not opt out, as their limitations periods had
expired.48 The Court dismissed this argument in a footnote by
explaining that the class action had tolled the class members’
statutes of limitations.49 This suggestion that tolling applies to

40 Cf. Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining
that American Pipe tolling “protects unnamed class members who may have been unaware of the class action”); In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that, under American Pipe, “members of the asserted class are treated for
limitations purposes as having instituted their own actions”).
41 See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782, 800 (7th Cir. 2006) (Wood, J.,
dissenting in part) (acknowledging the open question and opining that class action tolling applies to opt-out plaintiffs); Wasserman, supra note 14, at 829 & n.142 (recognizing
the open question and collecting cases on both sides).
42 See Crown, 462 U.S. at 347–48; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 543–44.
43 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
44 See, e.g., WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 250.
45 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 166.
46 See id. at 166–67.
47 Id. at 173 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)).
48 See id. at 176 n.13.
49 Id. (“This contention is disposed of by our recent decision in American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), which established that commencement of
a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class.”
(citation omitted)).
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those opting out of a certified class is dicta.50 But it has been
used by some courts to conclude that tolling benefits plaintiffs
who opt out of certified classes.51 Other courts, however, have
questioned Eisen’s intimation that plaintiffs can benefit from
tolling even when class certification is granted.52 Indeed, as I explain in Part III.B.1, other pronouncements from the Court suggest that tolling is not intended to apply to those who opt out of
a certified class.53
A pending class certification motion does not always end in
grant or denial, of course. Sometimes the class action terminates
before that ruling occurs. For example, the class representative
might drop the suit or settle her claims individually. Courts
agree that the duration of tolling continues until class certification is denied or the class action ends for any other reason.54
Thus, it is not quite right to say that some courts apply tolling
only if class certification is denied. Instead, these courts would

50 See Concordia Coll. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 999 F.2d 326, 332 n.6 (8th Cir.
1993); see also John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 3,
33 n.169 (1983); William A. Jonason, Note, The American Pipe Dream: Class Actions and
Statutes of Limitations, 67 IOWA L. REV. 743, 753 (1982); Note, Statutes of Limitations
and Opting Out of Class Actions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 399, 402 (1982).
51 See, e.g., WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 250, 253; Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985). Some have argued that Crown confirmed Eisen’s dicta that
tolling applies even if class certification is granted. See, e.g., James J. Mayer, Note, Rejecting the Class Action Tolling Forfeiture Rule, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 899, 915 n.90 (2019).
Crown did rely on the Eisen dicta, but only to explain that American Pipe applies to separate (rather than just intervening) filings. Crown, 462 U.S. at 351–52. Crown itself was
a case in which a separate suit was brought after the denial of class certification. Id. at
347–48. Moreover, the Crown Court explained from the outset that it was considering
the question whether American Pipe “permits all members of the putative class to file
individual actions in the event that class certification is denied.” Id. at 346–47 (emphasis
added).
52 See, e.g., Concordia Coll., 999 F.2d at 332 n.6; Wood v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc.,
643 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 1981); Chazen v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 247 F. Supp. 2d
1259, 1271–72 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Orleans Par. Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 892 F. Supp.
794, 804–05 (E.D. La. 1995); cf. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp.,
650 F.2d 342, 346 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining, without discussing Eisen, that tolling
does not apply where “certification of the class was granted, not denied”). Some state
courts have similarly questioned whether their state-law analogues to American Pipe
tolling apply when class certification is granted. See, e.g., Rader v. Greenberg Traurig,
LLP, 352 P.3d 465, 470 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
53 See infra notes 188–91 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 563
(7th Cir. 2011). This means that the tolling period continues even if class certification is
granted. This is because the class could still terminate for another reason or be decertified in the future (on appeal, for example). See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554
F.3d 510, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2008).
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simply withhold tolling until the class terminates—because certification is denied or for any other reason.55
B.

Recent Developments

The previous Section covered the Supreme Court’s early development of the American Pipe doctrine.56 That history teaches
us that tolling applies to plaintiffs intervening as individuals in
an existing action and to individual plaintiffs filing separate actions. The duration of the tolling period endures from the class
filing until the class is denied certification or otherwise ceases to
exist. Left unclear, however, are several other aspects of the doctrine’s application.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the doctrine, resolving two disagreements that had arisen in the lower courts. In
CalPERS, the Court held that American Pipe does not toll statutes of repose—time bars similar to but less flexible than statutes of limitations.57 One year later, in China Agritech, the
Court held that American Pipe does not toll successive class (as
opposed to individual) action filings. These decisions helpfully
elucidate the Court’s understanding of the doctrine’s legal basis.
This insight will prove valuable in resolving whether tolling
applies to plaintiffs who sue before a class certification decision
and whether tolling applies to plaintiffs who opt out of certified
classes.

55 See Pulley v. Burlington N., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (D. Minn. 1983) (explaining that tolling does not apply if the class “still exists”). This view of the doctrine, if
correct, would not be the only tolling rule under which the tolling period may increase in
duration but remain unavailable to plaintiffs until some future event. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d), for example, state law claims for which supplemental jurisdiction is sought are
tolled while they are pending in federal court. Yet tolling is not available for such claims
until they are actually dismissed from federal court. See Centaur Classic Convertible
Arbitrage Fund Ltd. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1019 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (explaining that “§ 1367(d) applies only where . . . a federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims”);
Parrish v. HBO & Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 792, 795–97 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
56 Prior to 2017, the Court last visited the doctrine in Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462
U.S. 650 (1983), decided just one week after Crown. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 20,
at 21. Chardon held that, in § 1983 cases, federal courts must look to state tolling rules
to determine the effect (for example, suspension versus renewal of the limitations period)
of class action tolling. Chardon, 462 U.S. at 660–62.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 10–12.
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1. California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ
Securities, Inc.
In CalPERS, a class action was brought against various financial firms for alleged Securities Act violations.58 One putative
class member, California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS), sued the defendants individually after the Securities
Act’s three-year time bar—the longer of two time bars in the relevant statute—had run.59 CalPERS argued that its suit was
nonetheless timely because this time bar was tolled under American Pipe.60 After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal for untimeliness, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if American Pipe tolled this second statutory time
bar.61
The Court began by analyzing the two statutory time bars
relevant to CalPERS’s claim, both found in 15 U.S.C. § 77m.62
The first time bar is triggered when the plaintiff discovers (or
reasonably should discover) the violation and endures for one
year.63 This, the Court explained, is a statute of limitations and
is meant to induce plaintiffs to diligently pursue claims once
they become aware of them.64 The other time bar begins running
at the defendant’s last culpable act—rather than the plaintiff’s
discovery of her claim—and endures for three years.65 The Court
emphasized the provision’s command that “[i]n no event” may a
suit be brought after its expiration.66 This, the Court said, was
the statute of repose and allowed no exceptions, providing a
complete bar on liability.67 This was the stringent time bar for
which CalPERS sought tolling.
The distinct “nature and purpose” of the statute of repose
would be critical in determining whether it was tolled under
American Pipe.68 Tolling is permissible only where the time bar
anticipates its prolongment, either through statutory authoriza-

58

CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2047–48.
Id. at 2048; see 15 U.S.C. § 77m.
60 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2048.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 2048–49. For further discussion of this statute, see supra text accompanying notes 8–12.
63 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049.
64 See id.
65 Id.
66 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77m).
67 Id.
68 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2048–49.
59
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tion or the traditional equitable powers of courts.69 The statute
of repose itself contained no express exceptions. And the very
purpose of the repose bar, the Court explained, was to override
any customary, equitable tolling rules.70 The critical question
thus became whether American Pipe was equitable tolling or,
rather, rooted in some other legislative enactment that might allow for tolling.71
The statute of repose could not be tolled because the American Pipe doctrine, the Court announced clearly for the first time,
is equitable tolling.72 The American Pipe rule was crafted so that
putative class members could rely on class actions without being
induced to make protective motions.73 Importantly, the American
Pipe Court had deemed the tolling rule consistent with the statutes of limitations that it tolled.74 These considerations made
clear that “the source of the tolling rule applied in American
Pipe is the judicial power to promote equity, rather than to interpret and enforce statutory provisions.”75
CalPERS argued alternatively that it did not need to rely on
tolling because the representative class action had effectively
and timely “brought” CalPERS’s separate suit for it.76 Four dissenting justices would have held for CalPERS under this theory.77 Importantly, the dissent did not argue for tolling, but rather argued that tolling was unnecessary because CalPERS was
effectively a party to the class action from the time it was filed.78
69

See id. at 2050.
Id. at 2051.
71 See id. (“If American Pipe had itself been grounded in a legislative enactment,
perhaps an argument could be made that the enactment expressed a legislative objective
to modify the 3-year period.”).
72 Id. at 2051–52. Even before CalPERS, others had suggested that American Pipe
set out an equitable tolling doctrine. See, e.g., Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting
Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 520–21 (2004). But see, e.g.,
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 20, at 29–33 (arguing that American Pipe is better understood as federal common law than as equitable tolling).
73 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051.
74 See id.
75 Id.; see id. at 2052 (“The central text at issue in American Pipe was Rule 23, and
Rule 23 does not so much as mention the extension or suspension of statutory time
bars.”).
76 See id. at 2054 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77m).
77 Id. at 2058 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
78 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2057 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When CalPERS
elected to pursue individually the claims already stated in the class complaint against
the same defendants, it simply took control of the piece of the action that had always belonged to it.”); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1232–
33 (10th Cir. 2008); WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 255.
70
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In the dissent’s view, the policy underlying the statute of repose
was satisfied because defendants were put on notice of the
claims against them within the repose period.79 The dissent also
pointed out that the Court’s decision would have inequitable and
inefficient consequences: putative class members who feared
that class certification might be denied after the repose period
runs would file early protective motions to preserve their
claims.80
The majority rejected this view based on the statute of repose’s express terms. The provision barred all new actions
brought outside the three-year period; even if a class representative timely sued, CalPERS sought to bring an additional action
after the repose period had expired.81 This is sensible, the Court
explained, because the statute of repose protects interests beyond notice to defendants.82 Moreover, the American Pipe doctrine would be unnecessary altogether if all putative class members’ individual actions were commenced as of the date of the
class filing.83 The Court acknowledged the potential inequity and
inefficiency of protective filings, but explained that it could not
ignore the statute of repose’s clear terms.84
I pause here to note insights from CalPERS about the
American Pipe doctrine that were not immediately apparent in
earlier cases. First, the Supreme Court understands the doctrine
to be one of equitable tolling. As I will explain, this limits the
circumstances in which it may apply. Relatedly, we learned that
the doctrine does not pursue efficiency at all costs. The more efficient result in CalPERS, as the dissent urged and the Court
acknowledged, would have been to toll the statute of repose. I
revisit these insights in more detail in Part I.C after reviewing
China Agritech.

79

See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2056 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2057–58. For two researchers’ estimates of the number of inefficient
protective filings caused by CalPERS, see generally David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah
B. Gelbach, American Pipe Tolling, Statutes of Repose, and Protective Filings: An Empirical Study, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 92 (2017).
81 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2054.
82 See id. at 2053 (“By permitting a class action to splinter into individual suits, the
application of American Pipe tolling would threaten to alter and expand a defendant’s
accountability, contradicting the substance of a statute of repose.”).
83 See id. at 2054–55.
84 Id. at 2053–54.
80
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2. China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh.
China Agritech considered the application of class action
tolling to successively filed class—as opposed to individual—
actions. The plaintiff, Michael Resh, filed a class action against
China Agritech for alleged Exchange Act violations.85 He did so
more than a year after the limitations period had run and argued that it had been tolled during the pendency of two prior
dismissed class actions against China Agritech.86 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Resh, deepening a split of authority among the
courts of appeals as to whether American Pipe tolls successive
class filings.87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the division among the lower courts.
The Court declined to apply the tolling doctrine to successively filed class actions. Its analysis centered on efficiency and
judicial economy, the “watchwords” of the American Pipe doctrine.88 The Court explained that these ends would not be served
by allowing class filings to benefit from tolling. Instead, efficiency and economy would be better served by incentivizing potential class representatives to file or intervene early so that courts
can decide as soon as possible whether class treatment is appropriate.89 Importantly, that defendants were put on notice within
the limitations period by the prior class filings was not enough
to justify tolling.90
The Court also explained that tolling for class actions would
allow them to be filed indefinitely. An original class filing would
toll the limitations period until it terminated, at which point a
second class filing would toll the period further until it terminated, and so on.91 As some have pointed out, perpetual tolling
would impinge on defendants’ interest, embodied in statutes of
limitations, to be free from old claims.92

85

China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1805.
See id.
87 See id. at 1805–06.
88 Id. at 1811.
89 Id. at 1807. The Court also explained that Rule 23 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which governed the litigation, evinced a preference for early intervention of potential class representatives. See id. at 1807–08.
90 The Ninth Circuit, in the decision below, wrote that it was appropriate to toll
Resh’s class suit because defendants were put on notice by the prior class filings. See
China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1805.
91 See id. at 1808–09.
92 See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 14, at 842–43.
86
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Understanding the Legal Basis of American Pipe Tolling

The CalPERS and China Agritech decisions are significant
because they clear up some of the American Pipe doctrine’s ambiguities. Most importantly, they clarify the doctrine is, at root,
a creature of courts’ equitable powers. At first blush, China
Agritech might appear to depart from CalPERS on this point.
CalPERS focused on the statutory intent of the time bar in
question, stressing that American Pipe set out a limited, equitable tolling rule. China Agritech, in contrast, focused on efficiency
and judicial economy. Upon closer inspection, however, the two
cases are easily reconciled.
A close read of China Agritech reveals that the doctrine’s efficiency justification dovetails with its equitable nature. Individual plaintiffs can put off filing individual claims so that they
can rely on class proceedings.93 The promotion of efficiency for
individual litigants is thus itself the promotion of equity. Conversely, those truly wishing to represent a class would efficiently
file or intervene early. As the China Agritech Court put it, “[a]
would-be class representative who commences suit after expiration of the limitation period [ ] can hardly qualify as diligent in
asserting claims and pursuing relief.”94
Hence, both CalPERS and China Agritech decidedly establish American Pipe tolling as an equitable doctrine. This is significant because the legal basis of the doctrine can affect when it
applies. For example, some courts had previously tolled statutes
of repose because they determined that American Pipe was “legal tolling,” rooted in and intended to further the policies of
Rule 23.95 As these courts had explained, a tolling rule derived
from a statute could toll a statute of repose, whereas a rule
based in equity, limited to remedying unfairness or excusable

93 See China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1808 (explaining that, in American Pipe, individual “plaintiffs reasonably relied on the class representative, who sued timely, to protect their interests in their individual claims”).
94 Id.; see also id. (“Ordinarily, to benefit from equitable tolling, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they have been diligent in pursuit of their claims.”). China Agritech’s
recognition of American Pipe tolling’s equitable nature is significant because it shows a
consensus on the matter that was not apparent in CalPERS. See id.; id. at 1814 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
95 See, e.g., Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1166–67 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 566 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (2012) (explaining that
some courts use the term “legal tolling” to describe a tolling rule “derived from a statutory source” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F.
Supp. 2d 164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009))).
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mistake, could not.96 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself recognized that a tolling rule grounded in another statute might toll a
statute of repose, but one based in courts’ equitable powers could
not.97
CalPERS and China Agritech also clarify another ambiguity
from the tolling doctrine’s early development: How far does the
tolling rule go in promoting efficiency and judicial economy?98
Efficiency alone may have demanded the opposite result in
CalPERS, yet this did not allow the Court to “ignore [the] plain
import” of the statute of repose.99 This, again, puts to rest explanations from lower courts that American Pipe is legal (rather
than equitable) tolling based in Rule 23 and intended to further
its policies.100
It must instead be that the doctrine is justified only because
of the benefit to individual plaintiffs who are equitably allowed
to put off filing their own claims. In other words, the precise efficiency served is not that of Rule 23 class actions or the court
system in general; it is only the efficiency that comes with equitably relieving putative class members from making individual
filings. This is confirmed by a careful read of China Agritech’s
statement that “[t]he watchwords of American Pipe are efficiency and economy of litigation, a principal purpose of Rule 23 as
well.”101 This statement confirms that American Pipe is not a tool
intended to serve the policies of Rule 23 class actions. Rather, it
serves efficiency and economy—goals of Rule 23 as well—by not
inducing putative class members to make protective filings.
I will argue in Part III that these insights—that American
Pipe is an equitable tolling doctrine and that its promotion of efficiency is limited by its equitable nature—help resolve unsettled questions concerning when class action tolling applies. But
first, I turn to the present state of the law on two of those unsettled questions.

96 See, e.g., Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 177 (D. Mass. 2009)
(“The differences between the forms of tolling is crucial because the animating principles
of legal tolling are compatible with tolling a statute of repose, while the reasoning behind
equitable tolling is not.”).
97 See supra note 71.
98 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
99 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2053–54.
100 See, e.g., Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1166–67; Arivella, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
101 China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1811.
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II. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS: WHEN DOES TOLLING APPLY?
The first unresolved issue considered in this Comment is
whether tolling applies to plaintiffs who sue individually before
a class certification decision. Specifically, courts disagree whether plaintiffs who file individual suits while class certification is
pending receive class action tolling. I explore this disagreement
in Part II.A. The second unresolved issue is whether tolling applies to plaintiffs who opt out of certified classes. This issue is
taken up in Part II.B.
A.

Does Tolling Apply to Suits Filed Before the Class
Certification Ruling?

Four federal courts of appeals have squarely decided the
question whether plaintiffs who sue while class certification is
pending receive American Pipe tolling. Three circuits extend
tolling to such plaintiffs, while one circuit withholds tolling
while certification is pending. I call these two positions the majority and minority positions, respectively.
1. The majority rule: sue now or sue later.
Three federal courts of appeals have squarely adopted the
majority rule: putative class members may benefit from class action tolling even if they sue while class certification is pending.
The majority circuits advance various rationales for this rule,
highlighted in the three cases discussed below.
The Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to
adopt the majority rule. In In re WorldCom Securities Litigation,102 pension funds brought individual securities suits against
several bond underwriters.103 Separately, a class suit was
brought against an underwriter not initially sued by the individual pension funds.104 After the applicable one-year statute of limitations period had run, the pension funds sought to add claims
against this additional underwriter.105 They argued that this
claim against the new defendant was timely because the limitations period was tolled by the parallel class action.106

102
103
104
105
106

496 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 252.
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The Second Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that
class action tolling applies even when plaintiffs “file an individual action before resolution of the question whether the purported class will be certified.”107 The court provided three reasons for
extending class action tolling to those who sue before the certification decision. The court first noted the “theoretical basis” by
which “class members are treated as parties to the class action
‘until and unless’” they opt out.108 This explanation does not appear to survive CalPERS, where the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that individual plaintiffs’ suits were effectively
brought, in a timely manner, by a class representative.109
Next, the court relied on what it saw as straightforward
language from American Pipe and Crown: “[T]he commencement
of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as
to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.”110
The court apparently read “the commencement of a class action
suspends the applicable statute of limitations” to apply tolling
as soon as the class action is filed. But, as one commentator has
pointed out, the qualification “who would have been parties had
the suit been permitted to continue as a class action” can be
read as withholding tolling until the denial of class certification.111
Last, the court determined that extending tolling to plaintiffs who sue before the certification decision is consistent with
statutes of limitations. Because defendants receive notice from
the class filing, “[a] defendant is no less on notice when putative
class members file individual suits before certification.”112 The
court also explained, quoting Crown, that class members who
file individual suits before the certification decision “cannot be
accused of sleeping on their rights.”113 The court did not, however, explain why Crown—in which a separate suit was brought
after the denial of class certification—can be freely applied to
suits brought before the certification ruling.
107

WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 247.
Id. at 255 (quoting Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 81–84.
110 WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 255 (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 353–54).
111 See Caleb Brown, Note, Piped In: The Tenth Circuit Weighs in on Extending
American Pipe Tolling in State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff, 62 OKLA.
L. REV. 793, 810 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554).
112 WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 255.
113 Id. (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 352).
108
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The Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s lead one
year later in In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation.114 In
that case, the plaintiff sued various plutonium producers after
living near a nuclear facility and being diagnosed with thyroid
cancer.115 A putative class of which she was a member—those
living near the nuclear facility—was pending certification at the
time she sued.116 Though she waited more than three years—the
duration of the applicable statute of limitations—from her diagnosis to sue, she argued that her limitations period was tolled by
the putative class action.117 The Ninth Circuit agreed, adopting
WorldCom’s reasoning and noting specially that this rule was
consistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations because
defendants were put on notice of the potential claims against
them by the class filing.118
The Tenth Circuit is the most recent federal court of appeals
to join the majority camp. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff,119 the plaintiff, Leslie Boellstorff, was
injured in an automobile accident and was allegedly not offered
enhanced personal injury protection benefits as required by
state law.120 Her suit was commenced four years after the threeyear statute of limitations began running.121 Boellstorff argued,
however, that her limitations period was tolled by a putative
class action for which certification was still pending.122
The Tenth Circuit sided with the Second and Ninth Circuits, extending tolling to plaintiffs who sue before a certification ruling.123 The court offered several reasons for adopting this
rule, most of which were the same as or variations on rationales
provided by the Second and Ninth Circuits. First, the court
looked to the Supreme Court’s language. It explained that
Crown’s statement that “[o]nce the statute of limitations has
been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative
class until class certification is denied” was clear and should be

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 995, 1008.
Id. at 1008.
Id.
See id. at 1009.
540 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1224–26.
Id. at 1226–27.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1232.
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accepted at face value.124 But as one commentator has pointed
out, the quoted language is followed immediately by “[a]t that
point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.”125 This can reasonably be read as withholding tolling until certification is denied.126
The court turned next to the representative nature of class
actions. Putative class members, the court explained, were “effectively” a party to the suit from the class filing.127 In this sense,
such cases “do[ ] not involve tolling at all.”128 As with similar
reasoning from the Second Circuit in WorldCom, this likely does
not survive CalPERS.
Like the Second and Ninth Circuits, the court next explained that the statute of limitations was respected because
State Farm received the benefit of the statute of limitations
when it was put on notice by the class filing.129 Notably, the
court’s analysis forewent any discussion of whether plaintiffs
had slept on their rights.
The Boellstorff court’s last two rationales concerned equity
and efficiency. As to equity, the court sought to avoid “locking
putative class members” into a class while certification is pending, a process that can take several years.130 Putative class
members, the court explained, should not be forced to “wait out”
the class certification decision.131 It is important to note, however, that class members are free to bring individual claims before
the certification decision so long as they do so within their own
limitations period.132 Thus, only when a putative class member’s
own limitations period has expired must she “wait out” the certification decision if tolling is not available.
124

Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 354).
See Brown, Note, supra note 111, at 810–11 (alteration and emphasis in original)
(quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 354).
126 See id.
127 Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1232–33 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Joseph v.
Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000)).
128 Id. at 1232 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155,
1168 (10th Cir. 2000)).
129 See id. at 1233.
130 Id.
131 Id. A similar argument has been put forth in commentary. James Mayer has argued that putative class members should not be forced to decide within their own limitations period whether to rely on the class or go it alone. Mayer, Note, supra note 51, at
935–36. He argued that this problem has become more concerning in recent years as the
uncertainty and difficulty of class certification has increased. See id. at 922–24. I discuss
this worry further in Part III.B.2.
132 The Tenth Circuit implicitly recognized as much. See infra note 134.
125
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As to efficiency, the court determined that the majority rule
would not lead to too many filings because those who would sue
separately while certification was pending would likely do so in
any case.133 That is, the court did not expect the number of suits
to increase under the majority rule because individual plaintiffs
will bring their claims within their own limitations periods or
else will wait for the certification decision to do so.134 For all of
these reasons, the Tenth Circuit joined the majority camp.
2. The minority rule: sue later.
Among the courts of appeals, only the Sixth Circuit has
squarely held that a plaintiff who files a separate action while
certification is pending may not benefit from American Pipe tolling.135 In Wyser-Pratte Management Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp.,136 a
plaintiff sought to bring a fraud action outside of the applicable
two-year statute of limitations.137 The plaintiff argued that its
limitations period was tolled by a class action, for which certification was still pending at the time it sued, for fraud against the
same defendant.138
The Sixth Circuit declined to extend class action tolling to
plaintiffs who sue before the certification ruling.139 The court explained that “[t]he purposes of American Pipe tolling” are furthered only “when plaintiffs delay until the certification issue

133

See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1233.
See id. (“[M]ost litigants with claims valuable enough to pursue separately will
likely have filed their individual claims before the end of their own limitations period.”).
The court added that, in theory, the minority rule might actually backfire and lead to an
increased number of suits. If putative class members are considering relying on the class
to press their claims, but are unsure how long the certification process will take, they
may file premature “placeholder suits rather than risk placing their individual actions
on ice during a potentially prolonged class certification process.” Id. at 1234.
135 Many district courts have also withheld tolling while class certification is pending. See, e.g., Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l Inc., No. 18-15286 (MAS)
(LHG), 2019 WL 4278929, at *7–12 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2019); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 465
F. Supp. 2d 687, 716 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Chinn v. Giant Food, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 331,
335 (D. Md. 2000); Rahr v. Grant Thornton LLP, 142 F. Supp. 2d 793, 800 (N.D. Tex.
2000); Stutz v. Minn. Mining Mfg. Co., 947 F. Supp. 399, 403–04 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
136 413 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2005).
137 Id. at 568.
138 Id. at 559, 568.
139 See id. at 569. The refusal to extend American Pipe to plaintiffs filing before the
class certification decision is often called the “forfeiture rule,” as such filers forfeit the
benefit of class action tolling under the rule. See Mayer, Note, supra note 51, at 902.
134
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has been decided.”140 Withholding tolling from such plaintiffs
would likely reduce the total number of suits because plaintiffs
may choose not to sue if they wait until the class certification
ruling is made.141 The Sixth Circuit also noted that, at the time,
all district courts to consider the issue had come to the same
conclusion.142
Some commentators have suggested that the First143 and
D.C. Circuits144 also withhold tolling while certification is pending. While both circuits have made statements consistent with
this position, neither have, in fact, squarely adopted it. The First
Circuit’s only statement on the issue is dicta.145 It is also possible
that the court was not aware, at the time it wrote on the issue,
that Crown had recently extended American Pipe to separate ac-

140 Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569; see also Bober, Comment, supra note 20, at 642–
44 (advancing a similar argument in the context of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling).
141 See Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569 (“At the point in a litigation when a decision on
class certification is made, investors usually are in a far better position to evaluate
whether they wish to proceed with their own lawsuit, or to join a class, if one has been
certified.”) (quoting In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 431, 452 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), vacated and remanded, 496 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2007)).
142 Id. (“[T]his limitation on class action tolling has taken hold in a number of district courts, with no courts rejecting it.”). Indeed, the courts to first consider the issue
took what later became the minority position among the courts of appeals. See Mayer,
Note, supra note 51, at 911–16.
143 See Mayer, Note, supra note 51, at 912–13; Jeremy T. Grabill, The Pesky Persistence of Class Action Tolling in Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 433,
466 n.130 (2014); Kevin Welsh, Comment, Collision Course: How Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f) Has Silently Undermined the Prohibition on American Pipe Tolling During Appeals of Class Certification Denials, 73 LA. L. REV. 1183, 1222 & n.281 (2013);
Brown, Note, supra note 111, at 794 n.7.
144 See, e.g., Mayer, Note, supra note 51, at 911–12; Wasserman, supra note 14, at
831 & n.147.
145 In Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1983), the plaintiff sought
to invoke American Pipe to cure a jurisdictional defect. The court rejected the notion that
the tolling rule could solve the jurisdictional problem and then added, in dicta, that
“American Pipe says nothing about [the plaintiff’s] ability to maintain a separate action
while class certification is still pending.” Id.; see Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select
High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780, 789 (6th Cir. 2016) (describing Glater’s statement
as dicta); Schimmer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 05-cv-02513-MSK, 2006 WL
2361810, at *5 n.5 (D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2006). Indeed, Wyser-Pratte did not even mention
the First Circuit’s treatment of the issue. See Wyster-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 568 (explaining
that, at the time, only district courts had considered the issue). But see Soroko v. Cadle
Co., No. 10-11788-GAO, 2011 WL 4478479, *2 (D. Mass. Sep. 23, 2011) (citing Glater for
the proposition that American Pipe does not apply to suits filed while certification is
pending).
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tions.146 As for the D.C. Circuit, its decision is better read as
withholding tolling for different reasons.147 Indeed, the district
court in that circuit does not invariably follow the minority
rule.148
To reiterate, the Sixth Circuit is the only federal court of
appeals to squarely hold that plaintiffs cannot benefit from
American Pipe tolling if they sue while class certification is
pending. The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, in contrast, allow individual plaintiffs to benefit from tolling even if they file
while certification is pending.
B.

Does Tolling Apply to Opt-out Plaintiffs?

Courts are even more lopsided on the question whether
American Pipe tolling applies to plaintiffs who opt out of certified classes. Notably, all four of the circuits to decide whether
tolling applies to suits filed before a certification ruling extend
tolling to plaintiffs who opt out of a certified class.149 They get
here by relying on the Supreme Court’s Eisen dicta.150 For courts
in the majority camp, this is a sensible result. If plaintiffs benefit from tolling even when certification is granted, it makes little
sense to make them wait out the certification ruling. But this
reasoning does not apply to the Sixth Circuit’s minority rule.
Under that scheme, plaintiffs can benefit from tolling if they sue

146 Although the Supreme Court had extended American Pipe tolling to plaintiffs
bringing separate actions just one month earlier in Crown, reference to Crown and its
holding are absent from Glater.
147 In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 650 F.2d
342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court declined to apply American Pipe tolling where “appellants
filed their own action nine months before the district court granted certification.” Id. at
346 n.7. Importantly, however, the court emphasized that “no intervention was ever attempted”; instead, plaintiffs filed a separate action. Id. Hence, the lack of intervention,
rather than the timing of the action, is likely what led the court to withhold tolling.
Crown, which extended tolling to separate actions three years later, likely abrogates Wachovia Bank’s reasoning on this issue. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit distinguished the
case from American Pipe because “certification of the class was granted, not denied.” Id.
148 See Howard v. Gutierrez, 571 F. Supp. 2d 145, 156 (D.D.C. 2008) (following the
majority rule). But see In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig.,
503 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 n.7 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Wachovia for the proposition that American Pipe does not toll claims filed before the class certification decision).
149 See Stein, 821 F.3d at 788; Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1229–30; WorldCom, 496 F.3d
at 250; Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 41–51. Some other federal courts of appeals
have similarly concluded that class action tolling applies even when plaintiffs opt out of
a certified class. See, e.g., Adams Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Asbestos Corp., 7 F.3d 717, 718 n.1
(8th Cir. 1993).
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separately the day class certification is granted, but oddly cannot do so if they sue one day earlier.151
The lopsided authority notwithstanding, some courts have
suggested that tolling does not apply to opt-out plaintiffs.152 These courts do not always provide reasons for declining to extend
American Pipe besides explaining that American Pipe itself did
not concern an opt-out plaintiff.153 Those that go further emphasize that plaintiffs who disavow an ongoing class action by filing
their own actions forfeit their tolling rights.154 It is not immediately clear why disavowal of an ongoing class action is inconsistent with class action tolling. Given what we now know about
the American Pipe doctrine, however, the possibility that plaintiffs have relied on a class action turns out to be quite important. I next explain why this is so.
III. APPLYING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS TO UNRESOLVED
QUESTIONS
I now turn to resolving the two unresolved questions outlined in Part II: whether plaintiffs who sue while certification is
pending benefit from tolling and whether plaintiffs who opt out
of a certified class benefit from tolling. I begin in Part III.A by
deriving guiding principles from the Supreme Court’s recent
pronouncements in CalPERS and China Agritech. The key principle is that, as equitable tolling, American Pipe applies only
when consistent with the statutory intent of time bars. The second principle is that American Pipe should allow putative class
members to safely rely on the class without making protective
filings. Critically, however, this efficiency goal is limited by the
fact that courts’ ability to promote equity is bound by statutory
enactments.
Part III.B applies these principles to cases in which only one
time bar—a statute of limitations—is present. This analysis reveals a more general rule: plaintiffs should benefit from tolling
only if they have plausibly relied on a class to press their claims.
151 The Sixth Circuit is not alone in reaching this result. Some other courts have
likewise allowed a plaintiff to benefit from class action tolling regardless of the certification outcome despite withholding tolling until the certification decision is made. See, e.g.,
Enron, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
152 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
153 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, 650 F.2d at 346 n.7.
154 See, e.g., Orleans Par. Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 892 F. Supp. 794, 803–05
(E.D. La. 1995) (applying Louisiana law but noting uncertainty as to whether opt-out
plaintiffs receive tolling under federal law).
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I argue that plaintiffs facing a statute of limitations have plausibly relied on the class—and thus should receive tolling—only
when they sue after a class has been denied certification or otherwise terminates.
Finally, Part III.C considers cases in which plaintiffs face
both a statute of limitation and a statute of repose.155 These
plaintiffs, like those facing only a statute of limitations, should
receive tolling after the class is denied certification or otherwise
terminates. Of course, CalPERS ensures that tolling will not
apply after the statute of repose runs. For this reason, I argue
that my test of plausible reliance allows plaintiffs facing both
time bars to receive tolling under one additional circumstance:
while class certification is pending but before the statute of repose runs.
A.

Guiding Principles from CalPERS and China Agritech

The CalPERS Court held that American Pipe does not toll
statutes of repose because doing so would contravene the statutory intent of these time bars. This is because class action tolling
is judicially crafted equitable tolling, rather than legislatively
based legal tolling.156 As a corollary, American Pipe should toll
statutes of limitations only when doing so is consistent with the
time bar’s “statutory intent.”157 To be sure, statutes of repose
provide a clear legislative command that they may not be tolled.
Even before CalPERS, the Court had held repeatedly that statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling.158 Nonetheless,
equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is likewise restrained
by statutory intent.159

155 Statutory time bars, like all types of legislation, vary. For example, some might
include express tolling exceptions. Thus, tolling rules cannot apply uniformly to all time
bars. See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2050 (emphasizing the “statute-specific nature” of tolling analysis). Still, time bars often share general qualities, and my analyses assume generic statutory time bars. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 7–12 (discussing
15 U.S.C. § 77m).
156 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051–52.
157 Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014); see also CalPERS, 137 S. Ct.
at 2050; Lozano, 572 U.S. at 11 (“We [ ] presume that equitable tolling applies if the period in question is a statute of limitations and if tolling is consistent with the statute.”).
158 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051.
159 See Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10–11; Note, Statutes of Limitations and Defendant
Class Actions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 347, 351 (1983) (arguing that class action tolling must
further efficiency without violating “defendants’ interests in notice and repose”); Sawyer,
Comment, supra note 22, at 111 (arguing that “[t]he American Pipe Court clearly recog-
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Understanding the statutory intent of statutes of limitations, of course, requires an inquiry into the policies underlying
these time bars. This inquiry is less precise for statutes of limitations than for statutes of repose, as courts and commentators
are uncertain as to the exact policies motivating limitations
bars.160
Two purposes of time bars commonly referenced by courts—
and, indeed, those mentioned in American Pipe and Crown—are
to provide notice to defendants and prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights.161 Of course, the policies of statutes of limitations have been articulated in many different ways: it has been
said that statutes of limitations avoid deterioration of evidence,162 promote defendants’ repose,163 encourage the prompt
enforcement of substantive law,164 and reduce burdens on
courts.165 Preventing plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights,
therefore, might simply be a way of promoting some of these unnized that the basic policies of the statute of limitations must be satisfied before tolling
benefits may be granted”).
160 See Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals: Rethinking How
Choice-of-Law Regimes Approach Statutes of Limitations, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 497
(2015) (“[S]cholars do not agree always about why statutes of limitations exist.”); Sawyer, Comment, supra note 22, at 111 n.24 (“Legislatures and courts have not clearly expressed what the real function of a statute of limitations is.”).
161 Crown, 462 U.S. at 352; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554–55; see Pierce, supra note 20,
at 346; see also CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8 (2014) (“Statutes of limitations
require plaintiffs to pursue ‘diligent prosecution of known claims.’” (quoting Statutes of
Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014))); Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 561
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Our decision [ ] must not be regarded as encouragement to
lawyers . . . to frame their pleadings as a class action, intentionally, to attract and save
members of the purported class who have slept on their rights.”).
162 See, e.g., Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828) (explaining that statutes of limitations “afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the
transaction may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explanation, by reason of the
death or removal of witnesses”); see also Bain & Colella, supra note 72, at 571–72.
163 See, e.g., Note, supra note 50, at 413–14; Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes
of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
164 See, e.g., Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868)
(“The policy of these statutes is to encourage promptitude in the prosecution of remedies.”); Bell, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 360 (explaining that statutes of limitations “produce
speedy settlements of accounts”).
165 See, e.g., Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“[C]ourts
ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his
rights.”); see also Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes
of Limitations, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 495–500 (1997); Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Brian E. Pastuszenski & Mark E. Greenwald, Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal
Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 1011, 1016–17 (1980). There are many other contemplated rationales for statutes of
limitations than those listed here. For a survey of many such rationales, see Ochoa &
Wistrich, supra, at 460–500.
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derlying policies.166 In any case, the dual purposes of providing
defendants notice and preventing plaintiffs’ slumber are a convenient framework encapsulating limitations bars’ statutory intent. Accordingly, tolling should apply only when these two policies are satisfied.
A second guiding principle concerns the extent to which the
doctrine furthers efficiency and economy of litigation. As explained in Part I.C, tolling serves efficiency by allowing putative
class members to forgo wasteful protective filings yet retain the
ability to litigate their rights if the class falls apart.167 This pursuit of efficiency is a narrow one, strictly limited by statutory
time bars.168 Based only in courts’ equitable tolling powers, the
doctrine cannot flout the statutory intent of time bars to further
independent policies. This restrictive understanding of American Pipe, critically, pushes back on the views of some that the
doctrine is statutorily based legal tolling or federal common law
intended to carry into effect the policies of Rule 23 class actions.169 If that were the case, the tolling doctrine could be used
to promote efficiency of class action proceedings in general, perhaps at the expense of statutory time bars.170 Instead, a careful
analysis of the Court’s recent pronouncements reveals that
American Pipe promotes efficiency simply by relieving plaintiffs
of protective filings. The furtherance of other policies, such as
Rule 23, is but a beneficial byproduct of the doctrine.
B.

Claims Facing a Statute of Limitations

I first consider when class action tolling should apply for
cases in which a plaintiff’s claim faces a statute of limitations
but not a statute of repose.

166 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 165, at 488–89 (citing Michael D. Green, The
Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 965,
981 (1988)). It is not necessarily the case, however, that disincentivizing slumber is intended only to further other policies. Preventing plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights
may be an end in itself, furthering normative values of diligence and promptness. See id.
at 489–91.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
168 Cf. Note, supra note 159, at 351 (explaining that tolling should further efficiency
“without interfering with defendants’ interests in notice and repose”).
169 See, e.g., Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009)
(explaining that American Pipe is legal tolling derived from Rule 23); Burbank & Wolff,
supra note 20, at 28–37 (arguing that American Pipe is a rule of federal common law authorized by Rule 23).
170 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051; Burbank & Wolff, supra note 20, at 29.
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1. Tolling should apply only after the class has been denied
certification or otherwise terminates.
As noted above, American Pipe tolling must comport with
the statutory intent of the time bar in question. The majority
circuits emphasize that defendants have already been put on notice by the class filing when individual plaintiffs sue before the
class certification decision.171 A class action filing connects the
defendant, the claims, and the putative class, ensuring that
suits by putative class members will not take defendants by
surprise.172 But the same is true regardless of whether separate
suits are filed before or after the class certification decision. Defendants are no less on notice when a putative class member
sues after the class certification ruling rather than before.173
Thus, both the majority and minority positions are consistent
with the policy of providing notice to defendants.174
The majority circuits also claim that their rule is consistent
with the policy of preventing plaintiffs from sleeping on their
rights.175 They reach this conclusion based on language from
American Pipe and Crown. They point to the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement that “[c]lass members who do not file suit while
the class action is pending cannot be accused of sleeping on their
rights.”176 They also point to the Court’s declaration that “no different a standard should apply to those members of the class
who did not rely upon the commencement of the class action.”177
From these Supreme Court pronouncements alone the majority
circuits conclude that plaintiffs who sue before the class certification ruling have not slept on their rights.

171 See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1229; Hanford, 534 F.3d at 1009; WorldCom, 496
F.3d at 253.
172 See Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985).
173 See Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 567 (explaining that American Pipe tolling depends
on the filing of the class action providing notice to defendants).
174 One might argue that the majority rule better aligns with the policy of notice because it allows individual plaintiffs to bring suits more quickly, before the certification
decision. This might allow defendants to better preserve any evidence relating to the
specific plaintiff bringing the separate suit. It is not necessarily the case, however, that
individual suits will be brought more quickly under the majority rule. Because the minority rule withholds tolling from individual plaintiffs until the class certification decision is made, individual plaintiffs may be more likely to bring individual suits within
their own limitations periods. See supra note 134.
175 See, e.g., WorldCom, 496 F.3d at 255.
176 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Crown, 462 U.S. at 352).
177 Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551).
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The majority circuits err in applying these statements—
both from cases in which separate suits were brought after class
certification was denied178—to cases in which suit was brought
before the certification ruling. Compare the differing circumstances. A plaintiff who does not sue individually until the class
action terminates can reasonably assert that she relied on the
class to press her claims. Only after the class was denied certification or otherwise fell apart was it necessary for her to sue separately. But a plaintiff who sues separately while class certification is pending is affirmatively separating herself from the class
rather than relying on it to press her claims.179 If she sues separately within her own limitations period, she need not rely on
tolling. And if she sues after her own limitations period expires,
it is not clear why she should benefit from class action tolling.
Such plaintiffs have potentially slept on their rights and can sue
separately only because a class action happens to have been
filed.
For these reasons, putative class members who sue while
certification is pending or after certification has been granted
can be accused of sleeping on their rights.180 Thus, plaintiffs
should be eligible for class action tolling only if they sue after
the class is denied certification or otherwise terminates. Plaintiffs who sue at that point “anticipated their interests would be
protected by a class action but later learned that a class suit
could not be maintained for reasons outside their control.”181
This does not mean that plaintiffs cannot opt out of a certified
178 Crown, 462 U.S. at 348; China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1806 (“American Pipe and
Crown, Cork addressed only putative class members who wish to sue individually after a
class-certification denial.”).
179 See 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:15, Westlaw
(database updated October 2020) (explaining that putative class members who sue individually while class certification is pending “cannot credibly maintain they have relied
on the pendency of the class action”); see also Ian Gallacher, Representative Litigation in
Maryland: The Past, Present, and Future of the Class Action Rule in State Court, 58 MD.
L. REV. 1510, 1551–52 (1999).
180 One student note analyzed whether applying tolling to plaintiffs opting out of
certified classes is consistent with the policies of statutes of limitations. See Note, supra
note 50, at 414–16. This note recognized that those suing after certification is granted
have arguably slept on their rights. See id. at 415 n.71. But it argued that plaintiffs who
opt out of a certified class and claim tolling have not slept on their rights because the
class must be certified “as soon as practicable” and the opt-out occurs within the period
set by the court. See id. This analysis, however, conflates properly opting out with making a timely claim. See infra note 182. Interestingly, the note recognizes elsewhere that
opting out and making a timely claim are issues to be treated separately. Note, supra
note 50, at 426.
181 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2055.
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class and sue—it means only that they cannot rely on American
Pipe tolling to ensure that their claim is timely.182
This analysis can be stated more generally: tolling comports
with the statutory intent of limitations periods only when
plaintiffs have relied on the class to press their claims. Otherwise, they are able to sue merely because they happened to fall
into a putative class.183 Indeed, reliance on class proceedings as a
prerequisite to tolling aligns with the common understanding of
equitable tolling. Equitable tolling is commonly said to be available only where a plaintiff has diligently pursued her rights but
is frustrated in bringing her claim.184 It is obviously difficult for
a plaintiff who has not relied on a class action to be frustrated
by it in attempting to bring her claim. Thus, plaintiffs affirmatively separating themselves from the class—either by suing
while certification is pending or by opting out of a certified
class—should not benefit from tolling.
Of course, it cannot be that reliance on a class action is necessary to benefit from tolling. Some plaintiffs who actually sleep
on their rights will inevitably benefit from tolling. For example,
some will sue after class certification is denied despite being unaware of their claims during their own limitations periods. Yet
the Supreme Court is clear that a plaintiff claiming tolling need
not prove reliance on or awareness of the class proceedings.185
This is because requiring plaintiffs to prove reliance on the class
proceedings would undermine the tolling doctrine’s equitable
nature. The doctrine relieves putative class members of the need
to make a protective filing or otherwise prove reliance on the
class proceedings.186

182 Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(v) provides that class members may opt out of a class. But this
provides only a release from the class’s binding effect on class members. See Note, supra
note 50, at 426 (“Tolling . . . is irrelevant to the function of the opt-out rule. The [opt-out]
provision merely relieves the plaintiff from the binding effect of the class action suit.”).
An opt-out plaintiff must establish separately that her action is timely. See CalPERS,
137 S. Ct. at 2053 (“It does not follow, however, from any privilege to opt out that an ensuing suit can be filed without regard to mandatory time limits set by statute.”); see also
Kennedy, supra note 50, at 33 n.169.
183 Cf. Prince, Case Note, supra note 38, at 1026 (explaining that plaintiffs who receive tolling without relying on the class receive an “unexpected windfall”).
184 See Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10; Booth v. United States, 914 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir.
2019); Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 1998).
185 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551.
186 See Jonason, Note, supra note 50, at 758 (“The Court allowed tolling to prevent
precertification motions at the cost of giving the benefit of such a tolling to members who
were unaware of the class action or of their own cause of action.”).
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Thus, what qualifies a plaintiff for American Pipe tolling
can be called plausible—not actual—reliance on the class proceedings.187 What I call “plausible reliance” can be inferred from
the timing of the individual and class filings. A class action
commenced within an individual plaintiff’s limitations period allows that plaintiff to argue that she would have sued earlier but
for the class suit. Only after the class fell apart did she need to
file her own suit. In other words, it is plausible that she relied
on the class from the outset and continued to do so until the
class dissolved.
The Supreme Court has never explained, decisively, that it
is the plausibility that a class member has relied on a pending
class certification that qualifies her for class action tolling. The
Court’s dicta in Eisen, in fact, provides support for the opposite
conclusion.188 But several statements from the Court support the
theory that plaintiffs’ potential reliance on class proceedings is
the linchpin of the doctrine. As early as Crown, the Court explained that “unless the statute of limitations was tolled by the
filing of the class action, class members would not be able to rely
on the existence of the suit to protect their rights.”189 More recently, the Court explained in CalPERS that “tolling as allowed
in American Pipe may protect plaintiffs who anticipated their
interests would be protected by a class action but later learned
that a class suit could not be maintained for reasons outside
their control.”190 Similarly, the Court explained in China
Agritech that “[a]ny plaintiff whose individual claim is worth lit-

187 My proposed rule of “plausible reliance” does not inquire into a plaintiff’s actual
reliance on a class action. There are, in theory, cases in which a plaintiff might actually
rely on a class but not “plausibly rely” in accordance with the timing rules I set. See infra
text accompanying notes 204–10. As the doctrine has never considered actual reliance,
Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551, I argue that such plaintiffs should not benefit from traditional
American Pipe tolling. They might, however, have an argument for equitable tolling in
general. See Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10 (“As a general matter, equitable tolling pauses the
running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.”).
188 See supra text accompanying notes 43–49.
189 Crown, 462 U.S. at 350; see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 474–75 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that American Pipe tolling applies “after the District Court [finds] class action an inappropriate mechanism for the litigation”).
190 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2055; see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313
n.10 (2011) (explaining that American Pipe held that “a putative member of an uncertified class may wait until after the court rules on the certification motion to file an individual claim”).
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igating on its own rests secure in the knowledge that she can
avail herself of American Pipe tolling if certification is denied to
a first putative class.”191 There is, on balance, ample support for
the notion that only plaintiffs who have plausibly relied on the
class should benefit from American Pipe tolling.
2. Responding to counterarguments.
One objection to my analysis is that it places too much
weight on the idea that plaintiffs should not sleep on their
rights. Tolling is fair to defendants, the argument might go, so
long as they are on notice of the claims against them. Yet preventing plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights serves other important polices, such as promoting defendants’ repose.192 Even if
a defendant is aware that an action might be brought (notice),
she still benefits from knowing that an action cannot be brought
(repose).193 Relatedly, repose interests are impinged on when
there is uncertainty as to the number of suits and forums in
which a defendant must defend herself.194 And for evidentiary
reasons, defendants benefit from knowing the precise identities
of individual plaintiffs earlier rather than later.195
Admittedly, the repose interests protected by statutes of
limitations are weaker than those protected by statutes of repose. For that very reason, statutes of repose are not subject to
equitable tolling at all.196 But that does not mean that statutes of
limitations’ repose policies should be overridden where there are
insufficient equitable reasons for doing so. This is especially the
case where defendants’ repose interests are protected entirely by
191 China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1810; see also id. at 1804 (“American Pipe tolls the
statute of limitations during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed
class members to join the action individually or file individual claims if the class fails.”);
id. at 1806–07 (“If certification is granted, the claims will proceed as a class and there
would be no need for the assertion of any claim individually. If certification is denied,
only then would it be necessary to pursue claims individually.”).
192 See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944) (“[T]he right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them.”).
193 See id.; Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 165, at 460–64.
194 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2053 (explaining that defendants’ repose interests
are violated when one class proceeding splinters into many separate proceedings after a
statute of repose runs); see also Steven T.O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right to Opt Out
of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 480, 486 n.29 (1998).
195 See Barney B. Welsh, Comment, Class Actions under New Rule 23 and Federal
Statutes of Limitation: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370, 381–82
(1968).
196 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2051.
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a statute of limitations, with no statute of repose backstop.197 It
may be equitable to allow putative class members to bring separate claims after a class action has fallen apart, but it is not equitable to allow a separate suit when plaintiffs’ claims are already being vindicated by class proceedings.198
In addition to unfairly impinging on defendants’ repose interests, applying tolling to those suing before the certification
ruling or those opting out of certified classes inappropriately
gives plaintiffs strategic advantages on top of an already “generous” tolling rule.199 Class proceedings already allow class
members to free ride on the class’s litigative efforts before opting
out,200 and a proposed class settlement provides a proportionate
floor for opt-out plaintiffs’ settlement negotiations.201 More generally, the “one-way interventionism” inherent to class actions is
exacerbated by an expansive tolling rule.202 Putative class members can stick with the class if it proceeds favorably or benefit
from tolling and opt out if they sense an unfavorable class outcome.203 An expansive tolling rule needlessly intensifies these
plaintiff advantages at defendants’ expense. In sum, that defendants are on notice by the class filing is not enough to justify
tolling for those that cannot show plausible reliance on the class.
Withholding tolling where plaintiffs have slept on their rights

197 See id. at 2049–50 (“The two periods work together: The discovery rule gives
leeway to a plaintiff who has not yet learned of a violation, while the rule of repose protects the defendant from an interminable threat of liability.”); Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,
559 U.S. 633, 650 (2010) (explaining that a statute of repose protected defendants from
stale claims that might otherwise be timely because of a statute of limitation’s discovery
rule); see also Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 470, 477 (1831) (“Statutes of limitations
have been emphatically and justly denominated statutes of repose.”).
198 Cf. Lowenthal, Pastuszenski & Greenwald, Special Project, supra note 165, at
1085 (describing tolling rules as balancing acts between preserving plaintiffs’ right to
sue and fairness to defendants); Jonason, Note, supra note 50, at 756 (explaining how
plaintiffs who benefit from tolling when opting out of a certified class receive a “windfall
tolling period”).
199 Crown, 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring).
200 See 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS § 13.05[2][k], LEXIS (database updated Nov. 2019).
201 See id.; cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class
Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 437 (2008) (explaining that plaintiffs who observe a proposed class settlement before opting out can
strategically evaluate their prorated share of the settlement).
202 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Class-Action Tolling, Federal Common Law, and
Securities Statutes of Repose: A Recommendation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 525, 541 (2015).
203 See Jonason, Note, supra note 50, at 762; cf. Couture, supra note 202, at 544–45
(making a pre-CalPERS argument that statutes of repose should not be tolled when it
would allow for greater one-way interventionism by plaintiffs).
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vindicates defendants’ repose interests and minimizes strategic
advantages enjoyed by class members.
A second objection to my restrictive reading of American
Pipe is that it excludes some plaintiffs who may have actually
relied on the class proceedings.204 For example, suppose that a
putative class member had intended to rely on the class but then
becomes dissatisfied with the results of a class settlement, class
definition, or class representative.205 Dissatisfaction with one
proceeding, however, does not justify equitable tolling so that
another proceeding may commence. For one thing, class members already have a right to intervene in the class suit in order
to object and rectify any inadequacies.206 Furthermore, Rule 23
itself envisions binding class members who fail to separate
themselves from the class when they have the chance; it does
not guarantee class members who have already received notice
and chosen to remain in a class a second opportunity to opt out
after a settlement is reached.207 This means that class members
who have chosen not to opt out at an earlier date may be bound
by a later settlement that they find objectionable.208 Class members who rely on a class to press their claims accede control to
class representatives and rely on the procedural safeguards
supplied by courts.
A third objection is that putative class members who wish to
sue separately should not be forced to wait out the class certification ruling. This is an argument made by the majority circuits,209 and one commentator argues that this concern is
heightened because the duration and difficulty of class certifica204 Such plaintiffs might still make ambitious arguments for equitable tolling in
general. See supra note 187.
205 See Jonason, Note, supra note 50, at 756.
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring notice of class certification orders to members of Rule 23(b)(3) classes); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B) (authorizing courts to
require notice to class members where such notice is required for fairness).
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (“If the class action was previously certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity
to request exclusion but did not do so.” (emphasis added)).
208 See, e.g., Low v. Trump Univ., LLC, 881 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2018) (recognizing district courts’ discretionary authority under Rule 23(e)(4) to allow a plaintiff to
opt out after she has already assented to representation by a class); see also id. at 1122
n.6 (explaining that Rule 23(e)(4)’s language “anticipates that parties can reach a settlement agreement that does not permit an additional opt-out opportunity”). This can
also be framed as a one-way interventionism issue: unhappy with the course of the class
proceedings, plaintiffs seek to go it alone.
209 See, e.g., Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1233.
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tion have increased since the American Pipe decision.210 Yet
nothing prevents these plaintiffs from suing within their own
limitations period. Those who choose to rely on the class are
aware from the outset that they will have to wait for the class
proceedings. Furthermore, uncertainty as to the course of litigation is inherent to all suits, including those that putative class
members might bring separately. Put simply, delay in one proceeding upon which a plaintiff relies does not justify the commencement of a second proceeding.
Finally, one may object that withholding tolling from
plaintiffs who opt out of certified classes frustrates the goal of
Rule 23’s opt-out provision.211 Statutes of limitations will often
expire before class certification is granted due to the duration of
the certification process. Thus, without tolling, class members
effectively have no right to opt out.212 As the Supreme Court has
made clear, however, the right to opt out and the timeliness of
claims are issues to be treated separately.213 And even if Rule 23
supports tolling for opt-out plaintiffs, this fact does not implicate
American Pipe. As explained, the American Pipe rule is rooted in
courts’ equitable powers, not Rule 23, and it is intended to allow
putative class members to rely on a putative class that may fall
apart. As such, a tolling rule intended to effectuate Rule 23’s
opt-out policy would have a different purpose and legal basis.
***
This Section’s analysis has focused on the first guiding principle derived in Part III.A: tolling must comport with the statutory intent of statutes of limitations. Because tolling for those
who sue while class certification is pending or who opt out of a
certified class is inconsistent with the statutory intent of statutes of limitations, it was unnecessary to implement the second
guiding principle: relieving putative class members of potentially unnecessary protective filings. That principle is more important for the scenario encountered in the next Section.214
210

See Mayer, Note, supra note 51, at 922.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
212 See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Le Carbone Lorraine, S.A., 500 F. Supp. 2d 437, 452
n.12 (D.N.J. 2007).
213 See supra note 182.
214 For cases in which claims face only a statute of limitations, it is unclear what
rule is most efficient and economical. The Sixth Circuit found its rule more economical
because the desire to sue individually “may evaporate once a class has been certified.”
Wyser-Pratte, 413 F.3d at 569 (quoting In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d
211
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Claims Facing Both Limitations and Repose Time Bars

The preceding Section considered cases in which a putative
class member’s claims face only a statute of limitations and not,
additionally, a statute of repose. I concluded that, in such cases,
a putative class member who sues separately should benefit
from class action tolling only if she sues after the class certification is denied or the class otherwise terminates. Only in such
cases has she plausibly relied on the class proceedings—a prerequisite, I argue, to the application of equitable American Pipe
tolling.
A wrinkle is added to putative class members’ decisionmaking when a statute of repose enters the scene. In this scenario, plaintiffs cannot sue separately if the class is denied certification after the repose period has expired.215 Under the majority rule, members of a class still awaiting class certification must
file before the repose period runs or risk losing their claims.
Plaintiffs are in an even worse position under the minority rule
(as well as the variation on it proposed in the last Section). They
must file even earlier, within their own limitations period, or
risk losing their claims.216 The Sixth Circuit itself has recognized
this problem:
We recognize that if a lawsuit asserts causes of action subject both to a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, a
putative class member in our Circuit is placed in a bind: beyond the repose period, no putative class member may file
an action, even if the district court has yet to rule on class
certification. . . . Wyser-Pratte imposes an additional hurdle:
if a putative class member files a separate action between
the lapse of the limitations period and of the repose period,
that action is barred because of Wyser-Pratte’s forfeiture

431, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated and remanded, 496 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2007)). The court
pointed out that those thinking about bringing individual suits may have a better idea
about whether they wish to do so after the class certification decision. See id. But as the
Tenth Circuit pointed out, the minority rule might actually lead to more total filings. If
plaintiffs are forced to choose between filing an individual action within their own limitation period or “sit[ting] tight for a class certification decision,” they may choose the
former in anticipation of a protracted class certification process. See Boellstorff, 540 F.3d
at 1234.
215 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2053–54.
216 See Mayer, Note, supra note 51, at 934–35; Recent Case, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1760,
1766 (2017).
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rule. Thus, a concerned potential plaintiff must file within
the limitations period or be out of luck.217
Our second guiding principle—putative class members
should be able to rely on the class without making protective filings—means that the inequity and inefficiency of this situation
should be minimized to the extent permissible by the statutory
time bars. I argue that this is possible to do under the general
rule that plaintiffs are eligible for class action tolling when they
have plausibly relied on the class to press their claims.
1. A novel rule: tolling should apply while certification is
pending so long as the repose period has not expired.
There is reason to believe that the permissible timing of
American Pipe tolling changes when both limitations and repose
time bars are involved. A plaintiff who files an individual suit
after her own limitations period has expired, but before a repose
period has run, might reasonably be found to have relied on the
class to press her claims. This is because a new obstacle—the
repose period—exists to frustrate a plaintiff’s ability to bring her
claim. She is no longer certain that she will be able to sue separately if class certification is denied. I proffer, therefore, that a
putative class member facing both limitations and repose time
bars should benefit from class action tolling when class certification is pending but the repose period has not yet run.218 Of
course, this proposed rule holds only if it is consistent with the
policies underlying both statutory time bars and serves efficiency and judicial economy to the extent permissible by statute. I
argue that these conditions are met.
Allowing a putative class member to file an individual suit
up to the point her repose period ends, while class certification is
pending, is consistent with the statutory intent of repose bars.
Statutes of repose are a legislative judgment about when a defendant should be absolutely free from liability.219 While a repose
period may encourage plaintiffs to bring claims in a timely
217 Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780,
795 n.6 (6th Cir. 2016).
218 Plaintiffs facing both time bars should, of course, also benefit from tolling when
they sue after the class is denied certification or otherwise terminates (so long as the
statute of repose has not run). In such cases they have plausibly relied on the class to
press their claims. See supra Part III.B.
219 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2049; see also id. at 2050 (“[T]he rule of repose protects the defendant from an interminable threat of liability.”).
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manner, this is incidental to the time bar’s purpose of providing
an absolute bar to liability after a set period of time.220 Hence,
allowing plaintiffs to file individual suits while certification runs
and before the repose period expires is consistent with this time
bar’s statutory intent.
Whether this rule is consistent with statutes of limitations
is a closer question. The rule accords with the policy of notice, as
the class filing provides notice to the defendant of the claims
and potential plaintiffs’ generic identities. But statutes of limitations also require that plaintiffs be diligent and avoid sleeping
on their rights. Plaintiffs who sue after their limitations period
has passed—but before the repose period runs—have arguably
slept on their rights in failing to sue within their own limitations period. The same could be said, however, of plaintiffs who
sue after the denial of class certification. Yet those plaintiffs receive tolling and “cannot be accused of sleeping on their
rights.”221 As explained in Part III.B.1, this is because those
plaintiffs plausibly relied on the class proceedings. Plaintiffs
who sue while class certification is pending but before a repose
period runs, likewise, have plausibly relied on the class to press
their claims. They may have relied on the class but now sue separately because of the looming statute of repose. This is the “extraordinary circumstance”222 that should qualify such plaintiffs
for equitable tolling.
Finally, the proposed rule serves efficiency and judicial
economy by equitably allowing putative class members to rely
on class proceedings without making protective filings. Without
the extension of tolling to filings made before a certification decision, plaintiffs may make unnecessary individual filings just
prior to the running of their individual limitations periods.223
But they can hold off, at least temporarily, if they are given the
entire repose period to decide. If the class is denied certification
or otherwise terminates before the repose period expires, they
will be able to benefit from traditional American Pipe tolling. If
certification is still pending as the repose period is about to expire, they may then make a protective filing to avoid losing their
claims.

220
221
222
223

See CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 9.
Crown, 462 U.S. at 352–53.
Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10.
See supra text accompanying notes 215–17.
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For these reasons, putative class members who sue while
certification is pending but before the repose period expires
should benefit from class action tolling. Such plaintiffs have
plausibly relied on the class to press their claims before suing
separately, allowing the statute of limitations to be tolled. At the
same time, defendants’ repose interests are protected so long as
suits are filed before the repose period expires. Importantly, this
rule furthers efficiency by allowing putative class members to
delay their individual filings until they are absolutely necessary.
2. Limitations of and challenges to the proposed rule.
The previous Section argued that plaintiffs who sue while
certification is pending but before the repose period runs have
plausibly relied on the class to press their claims. One can argue
this analysis only answers the question of when plaintiffs must
file; it does not imply that plaintiffs should benefit from tolling
before the class is denied certification or otherwise terminates.
Perhaps the separate suit should continue only after—and if—
the class falls apart: “[O]nly then would it be necessary to pursue claims individually.”224
Remember, though, that the important question is whether
tolling comports with the statutory intent of the time bars in
question. In dual time-bar schemes, the statute of repose is the
primary guarantor of repose while the statute of limitations encourages claims to be brought promptly.225 Suits brought before
the statute of repose expires but while certification is pending do
not contravene the repose bar. Nor are statute of limitations policies neglected. Notice was provided by the class filing, and
plaintiffs would have brought claims more promptly if they had
not relied on the class to press their claims. Accordingly, those
who file while certification is pending but before the repose period runs should be able to press their claims separately regardless of whether certification is ultimately granted or denied.
Another difficulty with my proposed rule is that some
plaintiffs who never planned to rely on the class still benefit
from tolling by filing after their own limitations period expires
but before the repose period runs. As explained in Part III.B.1,
class action tolling always lets some plaintiffs who have slept on
their rights slip through. But such cases may be more obvious
224
225

China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1807.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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under the rule proposed here. For example, suppose that a claim
faces a two-year limitations period and a five-year repose period.226 Suppose that both begin running at the same time, and a
class action is filed immediately. A putative class member who
brings a separate claim three years later has missed her own
limitations period by a year. Yet she files while two years remain on the repose period. Such a plaintiff does not appear to
have relied on the class to press her claims and should arguably
not benefit from class action tolling.
There are a few ways to attempt to manage this difficulty.
One idea is to require plaintiffs to file within a set period—say
six months—before the repose period expires. A rule withholding
tolling from those who sue long before the repose period expires
would seek to reserve tolling only for those relying on class proceedings. One shortcoming of this solution is that the set period
would be arbitrary.227 A bigger issue is that factual uncertainties
might make it unclear exactly when the repose period began to
run. Plaintiffs would understandably worry about missing the
correct time period in which to file.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is a rule requiring a
case-by-case assessment of whether a particular plaintiff relied
on the class to press her claims before filing a separate action
before the repose period runs.228 But this approach leaves plaintiffs uncertain as well. They will not know for sure, before filing,
whether a court will find that they relied on the class. This approach also seems inconsistent with the fact that American Pipe
extended tolling to all intervenors, regardless of their actual reliance on the class action.229
Because of the uncertainty in these solutions, a court adopting my proposed rule would likely apply tolling so long as the

226 These time periods are realistic. Claims brought under the Exchange Act, for example, are subject to a two-year statute of limitations and five-year statute of repose. 28
U.S.C. § 1658(b); see China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1804.
227 Cf. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010) (holding that the effect of a
suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel lapses after fourteen days); id. at 124 n.7
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgement) (“Today’s decision, moreover, offers no reason
for its 14-day time period.”).
228 Cf. Wood v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 1981) (declining,
in dicta, to apply American Pipe tolling where plaintiffs waited nineteen months after
opting out of class to bring their own action); Chazen v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 247 F.
Supp. 2d 1259, 1272 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (“The more persuasive reasoning rests in those
cases that have refused to extend the equitable tolling doctrine to cases in which the
plaintiff consciously chooses not to participate in the class action.”).
229 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551.
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plaintiff sues before the repose period runs and while the certification motion is pending. It would probably not impose a window in which to sue nor undertake a case-by-case analysis. That
some nonrelying plaintiffs who sleep on their rights will benefit
from tolling is an imperfection that the doctrine tolerates.230
I last note that this imperfection might motivate us to rethink altogether the doctrine’s lack of a requirement to prove reliance; perhaps only those who have actually relied on a class
action should benefit from class action tolling. Such a rule would
not be completely unprecedented. Before American Pipe, some
courts had suggested that class action tolling should be available only to plaintiffs who could prove reliance on a class action.231
The American Pipe Court, of course, squarely rejected any such
requirement; it apparently believed that this would be inequitable to plaintiffs (and perhaps burdensome on courts). This calculus has arguably changed with the advent of electronic communications and court filings. The CalPERS Court, for example,
suggested that putative class members facing a repose bar can
easily reserve their claims with protective filings.232 Limiting the
doctrine to those who can affirmatively prove reliance on the
class would be a welcome change to defendants as well as some
scholars who have questioned the supposed benefits of the tolling rule.233 Unless and until the Court makes this change, however, plaintiffs should benefit from tolling only if they have
plausibly relied on a class to press their claims.

230

See id.; Jonason, Note, supra note 50, at 758.
See Buford v. Am. Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251–52 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (allowing
members of a defunct class to “present proof of reliance upon the maintenance of the
class action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations”); Phila. Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (explaining that, in some cases, “an opportunity should be presented for proof of reliance upon the pendency of the purported class
action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations”); see also Prince, Case Note, supra note
38, at 1028 (arguing that plaintiffs should receive American Pipe tolling only if they
prove they relied on a class action).
232 See CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2054. The Court also suggested that district court
dockets would not become overwhelmed by such filings. See id. (“District courts, furthermore, have ample means and methods to administer their dockets and to ensure
that any additional filings proceed in an orderly fashion.”).
233 See, e.g., Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The Impropriety of
Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532,
572–80 (1996) (questioning the benefits of class action tolling and emphasizing its costs,
especially in the mass tort context).
231
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CONCLUSION
In this Comment, I have analyzed two of the American Pipe
doctrine’s unresolved questions. First, may a putative class
member who sues while class certification is pending benefit
from class action tolling? Second, does tolling apply to plaintiffs
who opt out of a certified class?
To answer these questions, I derived guiding principles from
the Supreme Court’s recent American Pipe jurisprudence. The
first guiding principle is that, as equitable tolling, American
Pipe must comport with the statutory intent of the time bars to
be tolled. The second principle is that the tolling doctrine serves
efficiency and judicial economy, to the extent permissible by
statute, in order to relieve putative class members of making
protective filings.
Applying these guiding principles to the two unresolved
questions reveals the underpinning of American Pipe: separate
suits filed by putative class members should benefit from class
action tolling only where they have plausibly relied on the class
proceedings to press their claims. Only in such cases does tolling
comport with the statute of limitation policies of defendant notice and plaintiff diligence, including the underlying policy of defendant repose.
Applying the test of plausible reliance yields different answers to our two unresolved questions depending on the exact
time bars faced. When a plaintiff’s claim faces only a statute of
limitation, she should benefit from American Pipe tolling only
after the class is denied certification or otherwise terminates.
Plaintiffs facing both limitations and repose time bars should,
likewise, receive tolling after the class is denied certification or
otherwise terminates, so long as the statute of repose has not
yet run. But the uncertain position of plaintiffs facing both time
bars means that they should also receive tolling in an additional
circumstance: when they sue while certification is pending but
before the repose period runs.

